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In the fall of 1984, the United States Treasury Department advanced
a proposal for fundamental tax reform. The changes in investment
incentives were designed to enhance fairness and economic growth.
The Treasury Department's plan took large steps toward denning the
tax base as economic income, and taxing that base at lower rates.
Compared to current law, it was argued that the proposed code would
tax more uniformly the returns from alternative assets, sectors, and
industries. This more even-handed treatment would produce incentives
for a superior mix of investment, which would in turn increase national
output. A subsequent proposal by the president and legislation passed
by the House of Representatives changed the specific features of tax
reform, but they were motivated by the same general principles.
1
During the continuing debate on fundamental tax reform, several
issues have been raised with respect to the treatment of capital income.
First, it has been asked whether the rate reduction is enough to offset
the more comprehensive base for the tax on corporate income. Higher
effective tax rates in the corporate sector might reduce corporate in-
vestment and exacerbate misallocations between the corporate sector
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and the noncorporate sector. Second, there has been concern that tax
reform proposals leave largely unchanged the treatment of owner-
occupied housing. Under current law, the returns to housing escape
federal taxation while mortgage interest payments are deductible. It
has been asked whether it is possible to achieve significant reform if
we maintain this favorable treatment for housing relative to business
capital.
Third, and related to the first two points, the magnitude of the im-
provements in the allocation of investment within the corporate sector
has been questioned. Efficiency might increase from making more equal
the tax treatment across different assets such as equipment, structures,
inventories, and land. Yet this gain may or may not be enough to offset
diminished efficiency from unchanged or worsened disparities across
sectors.
Fourth, if tax reform does raise total taxes on income from capital,
any gains from a more level playing field might be offset by losses
resulting from reduced investment.
Finally, there has been general interest in how tax reform would
affect different parts of the economy. Observers would like to know
which industries and sectors might be expected to expand or contract.
This paper develops a framework to provide information on all of
these important issues. We examine the original Treasury Department
proposal and the later proposal submitted to the Congress by the pres-
ident. We start in section 13.1 by measuring the impact of these plans
on capital costs and effective tax rates. Our measures are appropriate
for prospective investments, and they take into account the tax treat-
ment of various assets, sectors, and industries. In section 13.2, we
describe a general equilibrium simulation model that can evaluate the
long-term consequences of tax reform. This model can trace the ex-
pected reallocation of resources as well as measure aggregate changes
in the economy. Section 13.3 presents our simulation results in detail,
and section 13.4 summarizes our conclusions. While this paper contains
a comprehensive model of investment incentives, it does not provide
information about the effects of tax reform on equity, simplicity, or
other criteria essential to final policy judgments.
13.1 Administration Tax Reform Proposals, 1984-85
The Reagan administration has developed two sets of proposals for
tax reform. The first was the November 1984 report of the Treasury
Department to the president, entitled Tax Reform for Fairness, Sim-
plicity, and Economic Growth. It was followed by The President's Tax
Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity (May
1985). These will be referred to as the "Treasury plan" and the "pres-403 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
ident's plan," respectively. These proposals include pervasive changes
to the tax code, but this paper concentrates on provisions that would
affect taxes on income from capital. These include: (1) lower statutory
rates, as evidenced in the reduction of the top corporate rate from 46
to 33% and the reduction of personal rates to three brackets of 15, 25,
and 35%;
2 (2) revised capital cost recovery provisions, including the
repeal of the investment tax credit and indexation of depreciation al-
lowances; and (3) changed treatment of dividends, capital gains, and
interest income and expense.
This section measures the investment incentives arising from the
changes proposed by the administration, and compares them to incen-
tives under current law. Our model of investment incentives is based
on Fullerton (1985). The resulting costs of capital are then used as
inputs for the general equilibrium model outlined in section 13.2.
13.1.1 A Model of Investment Incentives
To derive a user-cost-of-capital formula like that of Hall and Jorgen-
son (1967), consider a perfectly competitive firm contemplating a new
investment in a world with no uncertainty. Assume the firm has suf-
ficient tax liability to take associated credits and deductions, and that
it does not resell the asset.
3 The acquisition cost is q, but an investment
tax credit at rate k reduces the net cost of the asset to q{\ — k). The
rental return on this asset starts at level c, increases at the constant
inflation rate IT, and decreases because of constant exponential depre-
ciation of the asset at rate 8. Local property tax at rate w is paid on
the asset's value at any point in time, and the return net of property
tax is subject to the corporate income tax at statutory rate u. These
net returns are discounted at the firm's nominal after-tax discount rate
r. The present value of depreciation allowances per dollar of investment
is z, so the present value of savings is uzq.
4 In equilibrium, then, the
net outlay must be exactly matched by the present value of net returns:




This expression can be integrated and solved for the rental rate clq.
Subtraction of 8 provides p
c, the real social return in the corporate
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In calculations below, common values are used for r, IT, and u, but
each asset has a specific value for 8, k, z, and w.404 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
If u and the corporate discount rate are replaced by the noncorporate
entrepreneur's personal marginal tax rate, jnc, and corresponding dis-
count rate, then (2) gives an analogous expression for p
nc, the social
rate of return in the noncorporate sector. Finally, owner-occupied hous-
ing receives no credit or depreciation allowances. A fraction X of prop-
erty taxes is deducted at the homeowner's personal marginal tax rate
ih, and the imputed return is not taxed. Use of the homeowner's dis-
count rate and an equilibrium condition similar to (1) provides p
h, the
social rate of return to owner-occupied housing:
(3) p
h = r - IT + (1 - ATJW.
To compute the rates of discount in each sector, we first assume that
individuals hold debt and equity issued by all three sectors, and that
they arbitrage away any differences in net rates of return. Suppose i
is the nominal interest rate, Td is the debtholder's personal marginal
tax rate, and/is the fraction of nominal interest that is taxed (and of
nominal interest that is deducted.)
5 Then, under our arbitrage assump-
tion, all assets must provide the real net return that individuals could
earn on their debt holdings:
(4) s = /(I - TJ) - IT.
Here, s represents the net-of-all-tax return in the corporate, noncor-
porate, and owner-occupied housing sectors. In our computations, we
start with an assumption on s and calculate / for all sectors from equa-
tion (4) as (s + ir)/(l - jj).
The computation of discount rates then involves examining sepa-
rately each sector and source of finance—debt, retained earnings, and
new share issues. (We assume that the financial decision is exogenous.)
The corporation's discount rate for debt is simply the net-of-corporate-
income-tax rate of return: r = /(I - uf). For retained earnings, the
individual's nominal net return must match /(I — ij). The investment
earns a nominal net-of-corporate-tax return r and the resulting share
appreciation is taxed at the accrued personal capital gains rate 7re. Also,
let 7 = 1 if the system taxes only real capital gains, and 7 = 0 if it
taxes nominal gains. Then the return r must be such that r(l - Tre) +
Trc^T
 = *'U ~ tJ)- The solution for r provides the requisite discount
rate. For new shares, we assume that each dollar of after-corporate-
tax return could instead be distributed as 6 dollars of dividends.
6 This
dividend is subject to personal taxes at rate 7ns. Thus, new share issues
must earn an r such that r8(l - 7ns) = /(I - ij). The corporation's
single discount rate is a weighted average of these three discount rates:
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where cd, cre, and cns are the proportions of new investment financed
by debt, retained earnings, and new shares, respectively.
In the noncorporate sector, recall that TWC represents the marginal
tax rate of entrepreneurs. Then, the noncorporate firm's debt costs
'(1 ~ Tnc/), and its equity must earn /(I - ij) after taxes, because of
individual arbitrage. Its overall discount rate is thus:
(6) ndW ~ tnM + ne[i{\ - Tdfl],
where nd and ne represent the shares financed by debt and equity,
respectively. For homeowners, th is the marginal tax rate, and a similar
logic provides their discount rate:
(7) hJLKX - T*)] + he[i(l - TJ)1
All of mortgage interest is deducted, but only/of other interest income
is subject to tax. The parameters hd and he are the respective debt and
equity shares.
7
Although investment incentives are properly measured by the mar-
ginal product of capital, p, we present many of our results in terms of
marginal effective total tax rates. These tax rates are the difference
between the pre- and post-tax rates of return, as a proportion of the
pre-tax rate of return:
(8) /-«^.
P
Because s is the return net of all taxes, this effective rate reflects the
combined impact of corporate taxes, property taxes, and personal taxes.
It shows the portion of capital costs attributable to taxes. The reason
for looking at effective tax rates is that they are easily interpreted. For
example, the effective rate can be compared with the statutory cor-
porate rate, or with the zero rate that would apply in the case of a
consumption tax. With s constant throughout the economy, t varies
monotonically (but nonlinearly) with p: assets or industries or sectors
with higher effective tax rates also face higher required gross rates of
return for investment.
13.1.2 Alternative Tax Laws
The above framework is useful to sort out the net impact of statutory
tax rates, cost recovery provisions, and other rules affecting interest,
dividends, and capital gains. This section proceeds to discuss values
for the parameters necessary to implement that framework, for current
law and for the two Administration proposals.
Statutory tax rates
For current law, we use the top federal statutory rate of .46 for
marginal corporate income. The weighted average of states' top-bracket406 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
rates has been estimated to be .0655 by King and Fullerton (1984,
p. 204). Accounting for the deductibility of state taxes at the federal
level, the appropriate value for u is .46 + .0655(1 - .46), which equals
49.5%. The Treasury Department and president's proposals would set
a top federal rate of .33 and maintain the deductibility of state corporate
taxes. For these reforms, u is thus 37.4%.
Turning to the personal level, we require marginal tax rates for in-
terest income (T^), dividend income (jns), capital gains (rre), noncor-
porate income (TWC), and interest deductions for owner-occupied hous-
ing (TV,). The marginal investment under consideration is an
equiproportionate increase in all capital stocks, with an equipropor-
tionate increase in the holdings of all investors. Additional debt and
interest income, for example, would be distributed among debtholders
in proportion to their current debt and interest income. The appropriate
marginal tax rate is thus the average of all debtholders' marginal rates,
weighted by their interest income. We include both federal and state
taxes. Furthermore, these rates must reflect the proportions of income
received directly by households and the proportions received indirectly
through institutions such as nonprofit organizations and life insurance
companies.
For households, federal tax rates were calculated by Lawrence Lind-
sey using the TAXSIM model of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
8 The computed rate for housing interest deductions under
current law is 25.0%. The rates for interest recipients (27.8%) and rate
for dividend recipients (33.9%) indicate that they are on average in
higher brackets than homeowners. The 26.1% capital gains rate reflects
the full taxation of realized gains, and the 19.5% noncorporate rate
reflects the low brackets of many proprietors and partners with losses
for tax purposes. All of these personal tax rates would be reduced by
the administration proposals. The TAXSIM calculations are available
only for the Treasury plan, but the three brackets for the president's
plan are very similar. Since these two plans would reduce the top rate
bracket proportionately more than other brackets, they would reduce
the weighted average rate on dividends and capital gains proportion-
ately more than the rates on other forms of income. The resulting
marginal rates were calculated to be: 21.0% for housing deductions;
21.9% for interest received; 26.2% for dividends; 20.8% for capital
gains; and 15.8% for noncorporate income.
In order to include state income taxes, 5 percentage points are added
to each federal rate under current law.
9 This percentage reflects the
weighted average of the different states' rates, and the deductibility of
state taxes at the federal level for those who itemize. Six percentage
points are added to the rates for the administration proposals to reflect
the repeal of deductibility.407 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
The personal rate on interest is then adjusted to account for the
taxation of banks, as described in King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 223-
26). The resulting rate for households must then be averaged with a
zero rate for the interest income of nonprofit institutions, and a .368
rate for the interest income of life insurance companies. This latter rate
reflects their 46% statutory rate and their 20% deduction for reserves
under current law. The final estimate for id is 23.1%. The same average
under the administration proposals is 20.5%.
The household rate on dividends is similarly raised to account for
state taxes and reduced to account for the dividends received by tax-
exempt institutions and insurance companies. The resulting value for
rns is .292 under current law and .242 under the administration pro-
posals. The noncorporate rate is raised by state taxes, but not reduced
by any holdings of institutions. It is .245 and .218 under current law
and the proposals, respectively. The final rates for capital gains (.052
and .105, respectively) are discussed below.
The weighted average rate for mortgage interest deductions is .25 at
the federal level, raised to .30 to account for state taxes. The TAXSIM
model indicates that about 70% of household real property taxes are
deducted. Thus ih and X are .30 and .7, respectively. The proposals
would reduce this personal rate to .27 and eliminate deductibility of
property taxes (X = 0). The final vectors of personal tax rates are
summarized in table 13.1.




















aThis rate reflects full taxation of real capital gains after deferral.
Capital cost recovery
Potential for nonneutralities arises because different assets depre-
ciate at many different rates, while tax codes tend to simplify by group-
ing assets into a few categories for depreciation allowances. In order
to capture these nonneutralities, it is important to include many diverse
assets in the model. Table 13.2 lists the 35 depreciable assets used in
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The economic depreciation rates 8 are estimated by Hulten and Wykoff
(1981) and shown in the first column of table 13.2. These range from
a high of .333 for autos to a low of .015 for residential buildings. We
also include inventories and land in our study, but these are assumed
not to depreciate, and they do not receive any depreciation allowances.
The second column of table 13.2 shows the lifetimes currently avail-
able under the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS). Autos are
depreciated over 3 years, other equipment over 5 years, public utility
structures over 10 or 15 years, and other structures over 18 years.
Allowances over these lifetimes can be read from tables in the law. In
effect, equipment and public utilities receive allowances based on 150%
of declining balance with a switch at the optimal time to straight line.
The depreciation basis is reduced by half the investment tax credit.
Other structures receive allowances based on 175% of declining balance
with an optimal switch to straight line.
At zero inflation, these allowances are high relative to economic
depreciation. They are fixed in nominal terms, however, so that at
moderate inflation rates, their real present value may be less than that
of economic depreciation. We use a nominal discount rate in calculating
z to account for the fact that allowances are based on historical cost.
The exact formula is shown in King and Fullerton (1984, p. 211).
The Treasury proposes to set allowances as closely as possible to
estimates of economic depreciation (i.e., indexed for inflation). In fact,
for their real cost recovery system (RCRS), they use the Hulten-Wykoff
estimates to group together similar assets into 7 classes. Each class
has an exponential rate for allowances and a "close-out" year in which
all remaining basis may be deducted. We use a real discount rate to
capture the indexing of allowances. The Treasury's grouping of assets
is indicated by the close-out years shown in column 3 of table 13.2 (see
Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, p. 161).
These allowances closely match the estimated real rates of deprecia-
tion. Since all remaining basis is deducted in the close-out year, how-
ever, allowances are slightly accelerated relative to the estimated ex-
ponential rates. Moreover, this near neutrality may be misleading to
the degree that allowances were designed to reflect these particular
estimates of economic depreciation. If 8 are mismeasured in some way,
then marginal effective tax rates are mismeasured.
The president proposes a capital cost recovery system (CCRS) with
6 asset classes, higher exponential allowances, a switch to straight line
at the optimal time, and indexation for inflation. Deductions are not
bunched in the close-out year as in RCRS. Our calculations use the
formula on page 211 of King and Fullerton (1984), with a real discount
rate. The groupings of assets under the president's plan are indicated411 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
by the close-out years in column 4 of table 13.2 (see The President's
Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity,
p. 145).
The other aspect of capital cost recovery is the investment tax credit.
Current law provides a 6% credit for automobiles, a 10% credit for
other equipment, a 10% credit for public utility structures, and no credit
for buildings. These rates are shown in column 5 of table 13.2. Both
the Treasury and the president's plan would repeal these credits.
Provisions for capital gains, interest, and dividends
In addition to indexing depreciation allowances, both proposals in-
clude provisions to index capital gains. The Treasury plan would further
index interest income and expense. This subsection describes these
and other innovative features such as the fractional deduction for div-
idends paid by corporations.
With respect to capital gains, the advantage of deferral cuts the
effective rate of tax approximately by half.
1
0 Current law also excludes
60% of realized long-term gains. Even after adding state taxes, the
effective rate on accruals is 6% for households, and it is 5.2% after
accounting for tax-exempt institutions and insurance companies. On
the other hand, current law taxes nominal capital gains (7 = 0). The
Treasury proposal would lower personal rates and index for inflation,
but it would fully tax real gains when realized. After state taxes, halving
for deferral, and averaging with institutions, jre would be .105 (with
7=1). The effect of this change can be seen in equation (5). The
president's plan taxes 50% of nominal gains at reduced personal rates,
so ire is 5.6%. After 1991, however, the investor can choose indexation
in place of the exclusion. For any given inflation rate, our model cal-
culates whether this option would be taken. In particular, if s = .04,
indexation is preferred to the exclusion if IT exceeds .04.
Nominal interest income currently is taxed in the United States, and
so / is set to one. In fact, the world has very little experience with
attempts to index income, especially interest income. The Treasury
recognizes the administrative difficulties of trying to measure real in-
terest income or expense, and so it suggests a more practical procedure
that is intended to have approximately the same effect. By knowing
the inflation rate ir, and assuming a 6% real return at the outset, it can
estimate the inflationary portion of the nominal interest as TT/(.06 + IT).
With 4% inflation, for example, the excluded part is .4, and/is set to
.6 in equations (4)-(7). All of mortgage interest is still deductible. The
president's plan would not index interest income or expense.
The two administration proposals introduce partial integration of
personal and corporate taxes by allowing firms to deduct part of div-412 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
idends paid. Currently, if the corporation gives up a dollar of retentions,
it is able to pay one dollar of dividends gross of personal taxes. Thus
0 is one. Suppose instead that a fraction g of dividends is deductible
against the corporate tax. The dollar of retentions corresponds to 1/
(1 - u) dollars of before-tax earnings. If these earnings were paid out
in an amount 8 of dividends instead of being retained, then corporate
tax payments would equal w[l/(l — u) — #0]. The after-tax return
available for dividends would thus be 0 = [1/(1 - u)] - u [1/
(1 - u) - g0], simplified as 0 = 1 + gu%. This equation implies 0 = 1/
(1 - gu). With u = .374 and half of dividends deductible under the
Treasury proposal, 0 would be 1.230. With a 10% deduction under the
president's plan, 0 is 1.039. The effect of such a change is that the firm
does not need to earn as much to provide the required after-tax return
to the saver (see equation (5)).
Other data
For local property tax rates (w), we use the same parameters under
all three tax regimes. Assuming that new investments will pay the same
property tax on average as existing investments, data in Fullerton and
Henderson (1984) indicate rates of .00768 for equipment and invento-
ries, .01126 for business land and structures, .01550 for public utilities,
and .01837 for residential land and structures.
Our initial assumption is that new investments have sources of fi-
nance in the same proportions as existing investments. Following King
and Fullerton (1984, p. 239), we find that corporations finance 33.7%
by debt, 61.4% by retentions, and 4.9% by new shares. Following
Fullerton and Henderson (1984), we assume that noncorporate firms
and homeowners also finance a third of their investments by debt and
two-thirds by equity.
We take the inflation rate, IT, and the baseline net-of-all-tax rate of
return, s, each to be 4%. Solving equation (4) with these assumptions
and id = .231, we find that / for current law equals .104. If s did not
change under the Treasury or president's plans, / would be .091 or
.101, respectively.
13.1.3 Effective Tax Rate Results
This section first concentrates on the incentives to invest in different
assets. We then aggregate assets to reflect investment incentives at the
industry and sector levels.
Table 13.3 presents allowances and marginal effective total tax rates
for 36 assets in the corporate sector. Under current law, the first 20
assets—types of equipment—have very low tax rates or are even sub-
sidized. These effective tax rates range from - 4 percent to + 3 percent,












































OOOO OO q p o
I f





8 §415 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
corporate levels.
1
1 Equipment has these low effective tax rates because
of investment tax credits and because of depreciation allowances in
excess of economic depreciation. Structures (assets 21-26, 32-34) face
considerably higher tax rates, between 32 and 48%, because they are
not eligible for the investment tax credit and because of their less
generous depreciation allowances. Public utility structures (assets 27-
31) have tax rates that are not quite as high as those for most other
structures, since they receive a 10% investment tax credit. The highest
tax rates are those for inventories (48%) and land (50%). These rates
are not reduced by any credits or depreciation deductions.
The Treasury plan eliminates most disparities in tax rates among
assets. It rescinds the investment tax credit and provides depreciation
allowances that are close to economic depreciation. Any remaining
differences are due solely to differential property taxes and to slight
variations in depreciation treatment. Effective tax rates in the corporate
sector all lie between 39 and 52%. The generally higher level of these
rates is due in part to the changes in capital cost recovery provisions,
but also to changes in the treatment of interest income and expense.
Currently, investments financed by debt are subsidized in that interest
payments are deducted by corporations at a 49.5% rate, and included
in taxable income of debtholders at an average marginal rate of 23.1%.
The difference between 49.5% and 23.1% is a 26.4 percentage-point
subsidy that is lowered by the Treasury plan to 16.9 percentage points
(interest deductions are made at a 37.4% rate while interest income is
taxed at a 20.5% rate). Furthermore, the Treasury plan indexes interest
deductions and receipts, so that this subsidy would apply to only the
fraction that reflects real interest. The application of the subsidy rate
to a lower base is yet another reason for higher effective tax rates on
debt-financed investments under the Treasury plan.
The president's plan would reduce the disparities among tax rates
for different assets, but not as much as the Treasury plan. The in-
vestment tax credit would still be eliminated, but depreciation deduc-
tions would be accelerated relative to economic depreciation. These
depreciation provisions introduce some disparities in the treatment of
assets relative to the Treasury plan. Equipment would be taxed at a
lower effective rate than structures. Accelerated depreciation also pro-
vides for preferential taxation of depreciable assets relative to inven-
tories and land. As well, the president's plan reduces the number of
classes of assets from 10 to 6. It might therefore introduce disparities
among effective tax rates of individual assets. Finally, in table 13.3,
tax rates are generally lower than those in the Treasury plan because
interest is no longer indexed. Compared to current law, effective tax
rates rise for equipment but fall for structures. These tax rates range
from 24 to 42%. The tax rates for inventories and land remain on the
order of 40%.416 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
Next, table 13.4 shows marginal effective tax rates by industry. Tax
rates for individual assets were aggregated using estimates of the 1984
stock of each asset used in each industry.
1
2 Under current law, these
industry rates range from 25.5% for utilities and 27.8% for real estate
to 42.9% for transportation equipment. The low rate for real estate
reflects the favorable treatment of owner-occupied housing, which rep-
resents about three-quarters of that industry's capital stock. Utilities
make extensive use of investment tax credits. Generally, manufacturing
industries face effective tax rates that are higher than average, because
they are heavily corporate. For the Treasury plan, real estate remains
low at 29.7% because owner-occupied housing retains most aspects of
its preferential treatment. Agriculture remains at 35.3% because of the
high proportion of noncorporate enterprise. All other industries' rates
are between 37 and 46%. Effective rates under the president's plan
range from 31.3% (real estate) to 39.6% (transportation equipment).
Whereas the Treasury plan had no industry's effective tax rate lower
than under current law, the president's plan lowers rates for half the
industries in our study. Overall, the president's plan is more successful
at narrowing the differences among effective rates across industries,
despite the Treasury's relative success at narrowing the effective tax
rate across assets.
1
3 The reason for this apparent contradiction lies in
table 13.5.




















Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Mining
Crude Petroleum and Gas
Construction
Food and Tobacco












































































.342oo - q oe
+ +
I418 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
Table 13.5 presents user costs and effective tax rates for the cor-
porate, noncorporate, and owner-occupied housing sectors. These rates
also are presented for several aggregated assets: equipment, residential
and nonresidential structures, public utility property, inventories, and
residential and nonresidential land.
Under current law, accelerated cost recovery provisions combine with
nominal interest deductions to generate a low total tax rate in the cor-
porate sector. Interestingly, the overall effective tax rate in the corpo-
rate sector is 37.2%, only 2.5 percentage points higher than the 34.7%
effective rate in the noncorporate sector, and 14 points higher than the
23.2% rate on owner-occupied housing (attributable to property taxes).
The Treasury Department plan actually increases the spread between
the overall tax rate in the corporate sector and the overall rates in the
other sectors. Less generous capital cost recovery and interest pro-
visions raise the rate in the corporate sector by 7.4 percentage points.
The effect of less generous cost recovery provisions is offset to a large
degree in the noncorporate sector by the 3% reduction in the tax rate
of proprietors and partners. For housing, the effective tax rate rises
by 2.5 points, mainly as a result of the end of deductibility of property
taxes. Under the president's plan, by contrast, unchanged corporate
sector taxation together with an increase in housing sector taxes pro-
duce more equal rates across industries and across sectors.
Our discussion has covered the incentives to invest in different as-
sets, industries, and sectors under each version of the tax code. Before
turning to the simulation model, however, we discuss a critical as-
sumption about dividend taxes that affects our evaluation of the admin-
istration's tax reform proposals.
13.1.4 Dividend Taxes: "New" vs. "Old" Views
The administration proposals lower the effective tax rate on cor-
porate dividends. Under the Treasury plan, in calculating the base of
the corporate tax, firms would be allowed to deduct 50% of dividends
paid. Under the president's plan, the deduction would be 10%. Yet
these changes have little effect on our results so far. Fullerton (1985)
found, for example, that a 50% deduction by itself would lower the
effective tax rate in the corporate sector by only 2 percentage points.
The reason for this relatively insignificant effect is that these results
concentrate on incentives at the margin. When a firm considers fi-
nancing a prospective investment by retaining earnings, it necessarily
delays a dividend. It may be shown that dividend taxes do not affect
the rate of return on such an investment, since they affect symmetri-
cally the dividend foregone initially and the dividend paid out later.
1
4
In the case of new share issues, on the other hand, there are no foregone419 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
dividends when the firm finances a capital investment. The personal
tax rate on dividends, ins, and the fraction of dividends deducted, g,
still affect the later returns to shareholders. Because of this asymmetry,
these dividend tax parameters do enter the discount rate for new share
issues in equation (5).
1
5
Our initial calculations assume that marginal investments are fi-
nanced in the same way as existing investments. Since new share issues
finance only 5% of the capital stock of corporations, changes in the
dividend tax have a small impact on the effective taxation of corporate
investments.
Our calculations so far are consistent with the "new view" (of Auer-
bach 1979; Bradford 1981; and King 1977) that dividend taxes do not
affect significantly the marginal investment. The competing tradition
or "old view" concludes that dividend payout rates affect the cost of
capital, and that there is significant double taxation of corporations
because profits are taxed once at the firm level and again when dis-
tributed as dividends (see McLure 1979). Under this theory, the pro-
visions for a partial deduction of dividend payments would tend sig-
nificantly to lower the effective tax rate for investments because firms




It is possible to construct a scenario that is consistent with the find-
ings under the old view, for a payout rate of 50%. Although existing
investments are financed 62% by retained earnings, it may not be pos-
sible to finance additional new investments entirely from that same
source. If corporations have a limited supply of retained earnings and
must increase their reliance on new shares to finance marginal invest-
ments, then equation (5) may be modified such that equity finance is
divided evenly between retained earnings and new shares (cre = .3315
and cns = .3315, with cd still equal to .337). Under this alternative,
dividend taxes have a substantial impact on the effective tax rate in
the corporate sector.
Table 13.6 indicates the investment incentives consistent with the
old view of dividend taxation. Under this alternative assumption, there
currently exists a 13-point gap between effective tax rates in the cor-
porate and noncorporate sectors. The two administration plans elimi-
nate about one-third of this gap. Under the old view, both new plans
would reduce effective tax rates in the corporate sector and thus reduce
intersectoral distortions. The reduction in corporate sector capital tax-
ation also means that the overall effective tax rate in the economy
would be virtually unchanged from current law. The rate is 38.2% under
current law, 37.6% under the Treasury plan, and 36.9% under the pres-
ident's plan. This slight overall rate reduction may bring about inter-
temporal welfare gains under the old view of dividends.
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13.1.5 Summary of Incentives under Tax Reform
Our analysis has emphasized multiple aspects of proposals for fun-
damental tax reform. When we adopt the assumption that marginal
investments are financed in the same manner as existing investments,
then our results are consistent with the new view of dividend taxes.
We then show that current law and the president's plan provide the
highest incentives for investment as a whole. The costs of capital (and
equivalently the effective tax rates on income from capital) are similar
under these two regimes. The Treasury plan would raise the cost of
capital almost 7% from its current level, and it might therefore deter
capital formation. On the other hand, both administration plans would
tend to allocate capital more efficiently across its uses. The Treasury
plan is most effective in narrowing the disparities in the cost of capital
across assets (within each sector), while the president's plan is most
effective in narrowing these disparities across industries and sectors
(but less across assets). Our overall evaluation of the effects of these
proposals on the economy will take into account all these distinctions.
When we adopt the alternative assumption that corporations are
more limited in using retained earnings to finance marginal investments
and must therefore rely more heavily on new share issues, then neither
new plan raises the cost of capital. Under this view, both plans also
succeed in reducing disparities across assets and across sectors. There-
fore, the resulting welfare gains would be expected to be higher than
under the new view.
13.2 A General Equilibrium Model with Allocation of Resources
among Assets, Sectors, and Industries
The investment incentives measured in the previous section are used
as inputs into the general equilibrium model developed in Fullerton
and Henderson (1986). This model is capable of simulating the effects
of tax reforms on production by different industries, as well as on
aggregate output. Furthermore, because of the detail on capital for-
mation, it can trace the flow of capital simultaneously among different
assets and sectors.
13.2.1 A Description of the Model
The consumption side of the model is taken directly from the general
equilibrium model of Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (FSW 1983), as
fully described in Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1985).
Twelve income-differentiated households have initial endowments of
labor and capital that can be sold for use in production. As indicated
in the top part of figure 13.1, these households each maximize a nested422 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
Utility U is a CES function of present
consumption H and future consumption Cc
Present consumption H is a CESJunction
leisure & and a composite good X.
X is a Cobb-Douglas composite of the 15
consumer goods X .
Each consumer good Xm (e.g., appliances) is a
fixed coefficient mix of the 19 producer goods
Q. (e.g., metals, transportation, and trade).
Each producer good Qj uses fixed proportions
of value added VA: and intermediate inputs A..
>VTVvv Intermediate inputs are the 19 producer
goods, in fixed proportions for each industry
Value added VAj is a_CES function of
labor L: and capital K,.
Capital Kj in each industry is a CES function \J





Use of capital in each sector is a CES
function of the 38 asset types.
Fig. 13.1
2/ In the housing industry, capital is a CES function of
A Diagrammatic Summary of the Model
utility function by making an initial allocation of resources between
present consumption and saving. The elasticity of substitution between
present and future consumption is based on an exogenously specified
aggregate estimate for T), the uncompensated savings elasticity with




In evaluating alternative tax reforms, we simulate a sequence of
equilibria in which the capital stock increases as a result of saving in
the previous period. Domestic saving is the only vehicle by which
investment can be affected, since the model is not open to international
capital flows. The model is open to balanced trade in commodities, but423 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
there is no scope for saving by foreigners to finance domestic capital
formation.
With present resources, as indicated in the next level of figure 13.1,
a household can choose to buy some of its own labor endowment for
leisure. The elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
is based on an aggregate estimate of 0.15 for the uncompensated labor
supply elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax wage. Present con-
sumption expenditures are then divided among 15 consumer goods
according to a Cobb-Douglas subutility nest. Each consumer good is
a fixed-coefficient combination of outputs of the 18 industries. The
model includes the entire spectrum of federal, state, and local taxes.
These are typically modeled as ad valorem tax rates on purchases of
appropriate products or factors.
1
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Our amendments to this model come in the specification of produc-
tion decisions. We provide a generalized equilibrium model with en-
dogenous allocation of capital across industries, sectors, and assets.
The structure of production is displayed in the bottom half of figure
13.1, where each industry determines its use of factors in a sequence
of stages. The first two stages are similar to the FSW model. First,
producers have fixed requirements of intermediate inputs and value
added per unit of output. Second, they can substitute between labor
and capital in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) value-added
function. The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in
each industry is chosen from an average of econometric estimates in
the literature. These average elasticity estimates vary from 0.7 to 1.0
across our 18 private industries. In this stage, however, we depart from
the FSW model which constructs capital costs from observed tax pay-
ments. Instead, we specify that a Hall-Jorgenson (1967) type cost-of-
capital formula determines the demand for capital in each of the 18
private industries, emphasizing investment incentives at the margin.
We also add two new stages of production decisions, as described in
detail in Fullerton and Henderson (1986). In the third production stage
of figure 13.1 for each industry, separate cost-of-capital expressions
are used to determine the division among the corporate, noncorporate
business, and owner-occupied housing sectors. Fourth, within each
sector of each industry, individual cost of capital calculations are used
to determine demand for up to 38 different asset types. These assets
include 20 types of equipment, 15 types of structures, inventories, and
land in each sector.
As described in section 13.1.1, the user costs for individual asset
types are built up from information on statutory tax rates, credit rates,
tax lifetimes, and other statutory specifications. These costs also de-
pend endogenously on the real after-tax rate of return (s) determined424 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
in equilibrium. A composite of those costs applies to each sector of a
given industry, and an additional composite of the corporate sector and
the noncorporate sector applies to the overall cost of capital for that
industry. Each industry has a different mix of assets in each sector, as
well as a different mix of sectors, all determined endogenously. When
the total use of capital equals the total available supply, we have equi-
librium in the capital market; when other markets clear as well, we
have a general equilibrium.
Our model is not limited to a unitary elasticity of substitution among
assets, as implied by the Cobb-Douglas functional form common in
previous studies. Instead, capital in the corporate sector or in the
noncorporate sector of each industry is a different CES composite of
the 38 assets. The elasticity of substitution among assets (e) may be
specified exogenously. Capital in each industry is another CES function
of composite capital stocks from each sector of that industry. The
elasticity of substitution between corporate and noncorporate capital
(<T) is also prespecified.
These generalizations are important because the choices of e and a,
as well as of r\, have much bearing on the relative size of different
distortions and therefore on the relative attractiveness of alternative
reforms. If e is high, for example, then changes in the relative tax
treatment of different assets would result in a more significant change
in the firm's production technology. A high value for e would therefore
imply relatively high welfare gains if a reform tends to equalize the tax
treatment of different assets. If CT is high, then the sectoral allocation
of capital would be quite sensitive to changes in the relative tax treat-
ment of corporations, noncorporate business, and owner-occupied
housing. High values of CT would be reflected in high welfare gains from
equalizing rates among sectors. Finally, the choice of t\, the savings
elasticity, matters for aggregate capital accumulation. If r\ is high, then
reduced taxation of the return to income from capital would result in
a higher saving response than in the case where t] is low. As this
assumed elasticity rises, any tax wedge between the gross and net
return to saving results in a greater measured efficiency loss. The gain
from reducing the overall tax on capital would therefore be larger as
y\ increases.
13.2.2 Simulation and Sensitivity
Before presenting the results themselves, it is necessary to describe
our simulations. We simulate a sequence of 6 equilibria that are 10
years apart, so our total simulation interval is 50 years. All our sim-
ulations assume an adjustment to lump-sum taxes (positive or negative425 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
as appropriate) in order to restore the revenue yield of the baseline.
We perform the simulations for each view of dividend taxes under a
"standard" set of parameters, and also under several alternatives.
The standard set of parameters include e = 1 and cr = 1, the Cobb-
Douglas case for assets and sectors, plus -n =0.4, which is consistent
with the estimate of Boskin (1978). Our strategy in constructing alter-
natives is not to show all plausible combinations of e, a, and r\. Instead,
we pick combinations that point out the likely range of welfare effects
from tax reform. Thus, for each view of dividend taxes, we simulate
the effects of one set of parameters that is likely to produce relatively
"favorable" effects and one that is likely to produce relatively "un-
favorable" effects. As discussed below, these sets of parameters nec-
essarily differ between the new view and old view cases.
We consider values of e and a between 0.5 and 3, and values of r\
between 0 and 0.4. As we stressed in our earlier literature review
(Fullerton and Henderson, 1986), existing econometric work on sub-
stitution elasticities does not consider the number of assets we include
in this model. Neither does it attempt specifically to measure a sectoral
substitution elasticity. There remains considerable uncertainty about
these parameter values. For the savings elasticity, our lower bound of
zero is in accord with the estimate of Howrey and Hymans (1978).
Under the case with existing financing shares—or new view—both
of the reforms reduce interasset distortions. In addition, the Treasury
plan increases intersectoral and intemporal distortions, while the pres-
ident's plan is approximately neutral in these respects. The welfare
gains might therefore be sensitive to the relative importance of these
interasset, intersectoral, and intertemporal factors. The two adminis-
tration proposals could be expected to produce the highest welfare
gains in the case where e is high. Low values of cr and t] would be
expected to raise estimated gains (or reduce losses) from the Treasury
plan, but to have minor impact in the evaluation of the president's plan.
Therefore a favorable set of parameters for the new view is: e = 3,
cr = 0.5, and r\ = 0; and an unfavorable set of parameters for the new
view is: e = 0.5, cr = 3, and r\ = 0.4.
We perform a second set of simulations using financing proportions
that give results consistent with the old view of dividend taxes. Table
13.6 indicates that, under the old view, both administration plans would
lower the differential taxation of assets and of sectors. Thus, these
plans would yield higher welfare gains the higher are e and cr. Because
they would also slightly lower the overall cost of capital, welfare gains
would rise somewhat with T\. TO analyze the sensitivity of these results,
we examine the old view under two alternatives to the standard pa-
rameters. The favorable case for the old view is: e = 3, cr = 3, T| = .4;426 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
the relatively unfavorable case for the old view is e = .5, a = .5,
•n = o.
13.2.3 Interpretation of Simulations
Simulation analysis such as we perform here can provide highly
detailed results. It is always necessary to bear in mind, however, the
limitations of such studies. We would like to mention three types of
issues: the quantification of tax reform measures; the specification of
economic behavior; and the usefulness of our results for policy decisions.
First, although our simulations take into account major elements of
the tax reform proposals as they pertain to capital formation, they do
not take into account all aspects of fundamental tax reform. For ex-
ample, both plans introduce substantial proposals for indexing. We
capture the effect of indexation on investment incentives at our given
inflation rate of 4%, but not on reducing the uncertainties caused by
varying inflation. To take another important example, the plans reduce
personal marginal income tax rates in ways that might increase partic-
ipation in the labor force and decrease activity in the underground
economy.
2
0 We do not measure welfare effects from these changes. As
well, the proposals introduce new features that could have sizable
influences on particular industries. Examples include the changes for
energy subsidies and for accounting in the case of multiperiod pro-




Second, any simulation model necessarily simplifies some aspects of
economic decisionmaking. One example relevant to our model is the
specification of financial choices. The reform plans raise the cost of
debt finance for corporations, yet we do not alter firms' debt-equity
ratios to reflect this change. Also, we have made specific choices with
respect to capital allocation decisions. Our use of the e parameter
implies that firms view all assets as substitutes for one another in
production; we omit the possibility that some assets are complements.
Our use of the a parameter attempts to capture the impact of capital
costs on incorporation decisions, but we do not explicitly model the
effect on these decisions of providing limited liability or access to
national financial markets.
Finally, it should be emphasized that we do not consider the effects
of fundamental tax reform on "fairness" or "simplicity," concepts that
are important in both the Treasury's and the president's reports. Any
changes in the achievement of these goals would be additional criteria
by which to assess tax reform.
In summary, the various results found in section 13.3 must neces-
sarily be interpreted with caution. Any overall evaluation of tax reform
should use appropriate additional information and judgment.427 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
13.3 General Equilibrium Results
13.3.1 Welfare, Output, and Capital Formation
Table 13.7 presents the welfare gains or losses as well as the effects
on capital formation. First, panel I reflects the new view. As shown there,
the tax reform proposals generally cause an increase in economic wel-
fare even if they bring about a decrease in the capital stock. The welfare-
reducing effects of the slight 1.7% increase in the cost of capital under
the president's plan and even the 6.8% increase under the Treasury plan
are generally offset by the welfare-augmenting effect of a better allo-
cation of capital across its uses. It is therefore possible to achieve larger
output from a given capital stock, and in fact—as the simulations indi-
cate—to achieve larger output from a slightly smaller capital stock.
2
2
In comparing the two reform proposals generally, we find that the
president's plan has larger welfare gains and a smaller drop in the capital
stock. These results follow from the findings in table 13.5 that the
president's plan would achieve greater reduction in the standard de-
viation of the capital costs and almost no increase in the cost of capital.
Turning specifically to the Treasury plan, efficiency effects are rel-
atively small for any set of parameters. Under the favorable case of a
high asset substitution parameter, a low sector substitution parameter,
and a low savings elasticity, the present discounted value of welfare
gains is $678 billion (1984 dollars). This figure represents an increase
of 0.6% over the present value of income and leisure in the baseline.
Under the unfavorable set of parameters, there is a welfare loss of $112
billion, or 0.1%. The standard-case parameters yield a slight increase
in welfare. The range of estimates for the change in the capital stock
is -0.5 to -1.9%.
For the president's plan, the indicated welfare changes are all pos-
itive, ranging from $292 billion to $861 billion (or 0.2% to 0.7%). Under
the favorable set of parameters, there is no change in the capital stock,
indicating that the "price effect" of a slightly raised overall cost of
capital is offset by the "income effect" of savings out of the greater
output generated by more efficient resource allocation. The other pa-
rameter combinations show a 0.2 to 0.3% decline in the capital stock.
We turn next to the old view of dividends, the case where marginal
equity investments are half subject to dividend taxation, and half to
capital gains treatment. The results in panel II indicate welfare gains
that are considerably higher than those in panel I, and changes in the
capital stock that are all positive. Under the old view, the proposals
reduce interasset distortions, intersectoral distortions, and intertem-
poral distortions. They therefore produce efficiency gains even in the
least favorable case where all relevant elasticities are small (e = .5,
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Furthermore, the findings for the Treasury and president's plans are
similar, as might be anticipated from their similar effects on both the
level and the standard deviation of capital costs in table 13.6. For the
Treasury plan, the cases shown yield welfare gains between 0.3 and
1.2% and increases in the capital stock between 0.5 and 1.0%. For the
president's plan, the welfare gains are estimated between 0.4 and 1.2%,
and the capital stock rises between 0.7 and 1.3%. This set of simulations
produces larger increases in welfare and capital formation because the
partial integration introduced by the administration's proposals is found
to lower the cost of capital significantly. The contrast between the new
and old views is particularly marked in the simulations of the Treasury
plan because firms would deduct half of dividend payments, as opposed
to only 10% under the president's plan.
13.3.2 Allocation of Capital among Assets and Sectors
Under current law, investment in equipment is tax-favored as a result
of the investment tax credit and very short lifetimes for depreciation.
At the other extreme, returns to investments in inventories and land
face statutory tax rates.
Both proposed plans narrow the differences in these tax treatments.
As a result, firms would alter their relative demands for these assets.
Table 13.8 illustrates this reallocation for the corporate sector, for the
standard parameters under the new view (where e, the asset substitution
elasticity, equals 1). Similar reallocations would take place in the non-
corporate business sector.
2
3 Under our 1984 baseline data, 29.5% of
the corporate capital stock is in the form of equipment. This share
would drop to 19.7% under the Treasury plan and 21.8% under the
president's plan. Inventories currently account for 34.2% of corporate
capital stock, but are estimated to account for 41.8% under the Treasury
proposal and 39.0% under the president's plan. The use of land in the
corporate sector would also increase. Firms would continue to use
Table 13.8 Eventual Allocation of Corporate Capital Across Asset Types



























aAssumes new view of dividends.430 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
about the same share of structures and public utility property, assets
that are currently taxed at rates close to the average rate for the cor-
porate sector. In the simulations with a higher value of e (not shown),
these reallocations are in the same direction but larger in magnitude.
As the asset elasticity parameter increases, corporations change their
production processes more sharply in reaction to changes in relative
user costs for different assets.
Our simulations also measure the effect of tax reform in redistributing
capital among the three sectors of the economy.
2
4 Under the new view,
both proposals would shift capital toward the noncorporate business
sector and away from owner-occupied housing. Additionally, in the
case of the Treasury plan, the 13% increase in the corporate cost of
capital would eventually result in an 8% decrease in the size of capital
in the corporate sector (see fig. 13.2). The president's plan would result
in essentially no change in the corporate capital stock, given the very
slight 0.3% increase in the corporate cost of capital.
The assumption about the effects of dividend taxation is a significant
factor in this allocation. When we adopt the conclusion of the old view
that the existing taxation of dividends discourages investment, then
the administration's proposals would increase capital in the corporate
sector. The 50% dividend deduction under the Treasury plan would
more than offset the cost-raising effects of less generous depreciation
allowances and the removal of the investment tax credit. Relative use
of capital would rise in the corporate sector and fall in the noncorporate

































Fig. 13.2 Allocation of Capital in the Corporate Sector after 50 years
(standard case parameters)431 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
in total capital, allow the corporate sector capital stock to rise by 5%,
as illustrated in figure 13.2. Under the president's plan, the 10% divi-
dend deduction in combination with more generous cost recovery pro-
visions than in the Treasury plan would also yield a 1% increase in
total capital, but a 6% increase in corporate capital, and a commen-
surate decline of 5% in the stock of owner-occupied housing.
13.3.3 Results for Industries
As just indicated, either reform would expand the productive use of
land and inventories at the expense of equipment. Also, under our
standard parameters (e = 1, a = 1, TJ = 0.4), and new view of divi-
dends, the noncorporate business sector would grow while the cor-
porate and owner-occupied housing sectors would contract. Since our
industry costs of capital are derived from asset- and sector-specific
costs of capital, the factors that affect asset and sectoral allocations
will also affect industry allocations. In a general equilibrium model
such as this one, simulations also indicate changes in demand for the
outputs of different industries. This change in the output mix generates
changes in the patterns of demand for labor and capital.
Table 13.9 presents the eventual changes in the output and use of
capital for 9 private industries.
2
5 Under the Treasury proposal with the
new view, the only industries that experience an increase in output in
the long run are agriculture and housing. These industries' capital stocks
also increase, as might be expected given their largely noncorporate
status and their heavy reliance on land. The capital stock is also pro-
jected to rise in the trade industry (because of the high use of inven-
tories) and finance and insurance (because of the low use of equipment).
The industrial pattern under the president's plan is similar, except
for the projected decline in real estate.
2
6 Also, more industries would
experience increases in output and capital usage.
Once again the theory of dividend taxation matters for the results,
since it affects the attractiveness of doing business under the corporate
form. When we adopt the old view (not shown), capital in the real
estate industry would decline and capital in the heavily corporate man-
ufacturing industries would increase, under both plans. There would
also be large increases in both output and use of capital in the con-
struction and trade industries.
13.4 Conclusions
Recent proposals for fundamental tax reform differ in their relative
emphasis on interasset, intersectoral, interindustry, and intertemporal
distortions. The model in this paper addresses these multiple issues in
the design of taxes on capital incomes. It is capable of measuring theu
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net effects of changes in statutory rates, credits, depreciation allow-
ances, and other features such as the indexation of interest and capital
gains. It can compare costs of capital for individual assets, sectors,
and industries, and it weighs these together to evaluate the impact on
total investment incentives. In a fully general equilibrium system, it
can simulate alternative resource allocations and associated changes
in welfare. For the overall evaluation of alternative tax reform pro-
posals, the simultaneous consideration of these multiple effects is crucial.
The model is used to compare current law, the Treasury Department
tax reform plan of November 1984, and the president's proposal of
May 1985. Under the new view that dividend taxes have a small effect
on investment incentives, both reforms would reduce interasset dis-
tortions and the president's plan would reduce intersectoral distortions,
but the Treasury plan would exacerbate intertemporal distortions. Still,
for most parameters, both reforms generate net welfare gains even with
slight declines in the capital stock. Under the old view that dividend
taxes have a significant effect on investment incentives, both plans
reduce corporate taxation through their partial deductions for dividends
paid. They thus reduce intersectoral distortions as well as differences
among assets. Under this view, the Treasury plan no longer increases
intertemporal distortions. Even for the least favorable set of parameters
in this case, these reforms raise both the capital stock and the real
value of output above their baseline values. Finally, the paper shows
alternative allocations of capital among assets, sectors, and industries.
Notes
1. We do not evaluate the House bill here. Charles McLure (1986) provides
excellent description and analysis of the revisions in the proposals between
fall 1984 and spring 1985.
2. This paper does not consider the effects of these rate cuts on labor income
and labor supply. We concentrate exclusively on their effects on capital.
3. The effects of uncertainty and imperfect loss offsets are investigated in
Auerbach (1983) and Auerbach and Poterba (1987).
4. For a variety of reasons not captured here, firms may not always minimize
their taxes by taking the earliest possible deductions. In order to concentrate
on the tax wedge and to insure comparability across tax regimes, however,
calculations here assume tax minimizing behavior. Similarly, firms pay unnec-
essary taxes by using FIFO inventory accounting, but calculations here assume
LIFO methods. The effect of FIFO inventory accounting is shown in Hen-
derson (1985).
5. The fraction/is 1.0 under current U.S. law.
6. The parameter 0 is the opportunity cost of retentions in terms of forgone
dividends (gross of personal taxes). It is 1.0 under current law.
7. One obvious result of our arbitrage assumption is that if individuals earn
the same rate of return net of all taxes from debt and equity, then the firm434 Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson
must earn a higher marginal product on a project financed by equity than on
the same project financed by debt. In a context of perfect certainty, this can
be justified only if for some reason firms must use a given mix of finance. Here,
we do not model the role of uncertainty or institutional restrictions that cause
observed financing choices. We take these choices to be exogenous. An alter-
native assumption might be that firms, rather than individuals, arbitrage be-
tween debt and equity. The effects of firm arbitrage on measured tax rates are
explored in Fullerton and Henderson (1984), Henderson (1985), and Fullerton
(1985). This alternative view would be supported in the perfect certainty frame-
work only if individuals in different income groups specialize in different assets,
as in Miller (1977).
8. See Lindsey and Navratil (1985) for further description of this model.
9. See p. 221 of King and Fullerton (1984).
10. See King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 221-22).
11. A subsidy, or negative effective tax rate, means that tax credits and
depreciation allowances are so generous that they outweigh the effects of taxes
on net income and property values. Under a subsidy, the value of p required
to earn s = .04 after tax is lower than 4%.
12. From the July 1985 Survey of Current Business, we obtain 1981 data for
corporate equipment, corporate structures, noncorporate equipment, and non-
corporate structures. We also obtain data for total depreciable capital stocks
by 18 industries. We project each of these 22 capital stock figures to 1984 by
using an econometric estimate of the relationship between economic growth
and capital formation. We then use an RAS procedure with these 1984 targets
to adjust an unpublished 1977 matrix from Dale Jorgenson, showing each of
these four types of assets used in each of the 18 industries. Finally, we obtain
the finer capital allocations for all 20 types of equipment and 15 types of
structures, by using disaggregate proportions in the Jorgenson data. These data
also form the basis for our 1984 projections for the values of land and inventories
in each of our industries.
13. An important caveat to these statements is that we have assumed identical
financing shares for all assets, industries, and sectors.
14. To see this argument, consider a firm that wishes to invest in $1 more
of capital by retaining an additional dollar of earnings. To retain an extra dollar,
the firm must necessarily reduce dividend payments. As shown in section
13.1.2, the dividends foregone equal 1/(1 — gu) gross of personal tax, or
(1 ~ Tns)/(1 — gu) net of personal tax. (Recall that u is the statutory corporate
rate, g the fraction of dividends deductible from corporate income, and rns the
personal tax rate on dividend income.) In the following period the asset earns
a pretax return of r, and the resulting income available for dividend payout is
r(l - u)/(l - gu), or (1 - Tns)r(l - u) l{\ - gu) net of personal tax. The
return to shareholders relative to dividends foregone in the first period is thus
r(l — u). This return is independent of the parameters jns and g, since these
affect identically the numerator and denominator in the calculation of the rate
of return.
15. The parameter g enters because 6 = 1/(1 — gu).
16. The new view received empirical support in a study by Auerbach (1984),
but the old view was found more compatible with historical evidence in Poterba
and Summers (1983, 1985). Poterba and Summers (1985) also explain some
conceptual problems associated with each theory.
17. Another finding is that the Treasury plan is neutral with respect to firms'
choices between retaining earnings and issuing new shares. That is, the costs
of capital in the corporate sector do not differ between Tables 13.5 and 13.6.
Although the Treasury plan maintains personal tax rates that are lower for435 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
capital gains than for dividends, the 50% dividend deduction at the corporate
level completely offsets this rate differential. We do not attempt to measure
potential efficiency gains from any reduced distortions in financial decisions.
18. Our model assumes that households form expectations of the rate of
return myopically. Ballard and Goulder (1985) examine the effect of incorpo-
rating perfect foresight expectations into the Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley model.
19. The model also requires that government run a balanced budget. There-
fore, when our simulations raise (lower) national output and income, we must
offset the resulting revenue gains (losses) by cutting (increasing) some other
tax. We do this by changing income taxes in a lump-sum manner.
20. These effects are analyzed by Slemrod (1986).
21. The construction of a measure for the cost of capital requires assessments
about the degree to which various aspects of taxation affect investment at the
margin. Some corporate tax features may affect employment, profits, or other
behavior, without affecting investment at the margin. The windfall recapture
tax of the president's proposal, for example, would acquire revenue from
corporations that received accelerated depreciation on their existing holdings
of assets and that would earn income subject to the new lower rate. Other
provisions in the proposals would affect the timing of revenue more than they
affect the present value of tax on marginal investment. Indeed, it is because
tax revenue is often a poor guide to investment incentives that we turn to the
concept of the cost of capital. Yet, because the cost of capital cannot account
for every feature of the tax code, it may omit important effects on incentives.
22. Although our measure of welfare gain includes changes in the value of
leisure time, the simulations affect leisure only slightly. Therefore, output and
welfare move in the same direction.
23. The results under standard parameters for the old view are similar. The
choice between the old view and the new view primarily affects the relative
costs of investment across sectors, not across assets within a sector.
24. Figure 2 again considers the standard parameters, with e = 1, a = 1,
and 7] = 0.4.
25. In Table 13.9, industry 2 combines the two extractive industries in our
model, while the manufacturing category combines 9 more detailed industries:
food and tobacco; textiles, apparel, and leather; paper and printing; petroleum
refining; chemicals and rubber; lumber, furniture, stone, clay, and glass; metals
and machinery; transportation equipment; and motor vehicles.
26. The proposals appear to treat owner-occupied housing identically, since
both would terminate the deduction for local property taxes and both maintain
full deductibility of mortgage interest payments. However, the Treasury pro-
posal indexes interest deductions of businesses and thus reduces the nominal
interest rate (see Table 13.5). The Treasury plan therefore lowers the relative
cost of housing capital more than does the president's proposal (which has no
interest indexing).
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Comment J. Gregory Ballentine
The Fullerton/Henderson analysis embodies important extensions of
previous large scale general equilibrium modeling of tax changes. As
such, the analysis is highly valuable. The extensions, however, are far
too preliminary and the modeling of tax changes is too limited to provide
reliable answers to the questions the paper poses concerning the effect
of the Treasury reform proposals on economic efficiency. In particular,
the limitations in the modeling of tax changes cause an understatement
of the rise in the cost of capital induced by the Treasury proposal that
may make the results misleading. This limitation is not unique to the
Fullerton/Henderson analysis; it is quite common.
Three specific limitations of the Fullerton/Henderson analysis are
presented below. The first, and the one that will be discussed at greatest
length, is the incomplete modeling of tax changes. The second is the
measurement of certain tax parameters, and the third is the empirical
foundation for the modeling of the choice between corporate and non-
corporate form.
The Modeling of Tax Law Changes
The Fullerton/Henderson analysis purportedly examines the effect
of the two tax reform proposals, Treasury I and II (referred to above
as the Treasury plan and the President's plan, respectively), on the
J. Gregory Ballentine is Principal and National Director of Tax Analysis at Peat, Mar-
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interindustry, intersectoral, and inter temporal allocation of capital. Ac-
cordingly, the primary focus of the paper is on the effects of the capital
income tax changes. The analysis, however, only takes into account
some of the tax changes in the Treasury proposals. Specifically, the
elimination of the ITC, the new depreciation schedules, indexing, the
new tax rates, and the dividend deduction are included; other provi-
sions are omitted.
The table below shows the revenue effect for 1985 and 1990 of the
corporate income tax provisions included in the paper compared with
the omitted corporate provisions. (The windfall recapture provision
and a few other clearly inframarginal provisions are excluded from the
table. Indexed FIFO is also excluded since the paper assumes LIFO
is used.)
Treasury I Treasury II







































This table only includes corporate tax provisions. Also omitted from
the paper are various pension changes that, on balance, raise revenues
and, presumably, raise the cost of capital. The main point to recognize
is that these numbers strongly suggest that the Fullerton/Henderson
analysis understates the increase in the cost of capital and may, there-
fore, give a much more favorable impression of the effects of the two
reform proposals than is warranted.
The revenue estimates do not prove this conclusion, but only suggest
it for at least two reasons. First, revenue estimates include some purely
inframarginal effects and, second, they represent some proposals that
may improve the interasset allocation of resources.
Broadly speaking, the omitted corporate provisions fall into three
categories: those directly affecting certain assets, those affecting fi-
nancial intermediation, and those affecting international investments.
Included in the first category are the changes in multiperiod accounting
rules. Consider, for example, work in process inventory investment.
Under current law a portion of the cost of such investment is expensed.439 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
That portion includes certain labor costs (mostly pension costs) as well
as some interest and capital costs.
Treasury I and II reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the amount that
can be expensed. The same changes are proposed for self-constructed
assets; under current law part of that investment is expensed and part
depreciated using ACRS. Treasury I and II reduce or eliminate that
expensing.
With adequate data on inventory investment and investment in self-
constructed assets, incorporating the multiperiod accounting changes
in the Fullerton/Henderson analysis should be straightforward. That
is, fractional expensing fits easily into the Jorgenson cost-of-capital
framework that Fullerton/Henderson use. This change alone would be
useful. In Treasury II these multiperiod accounting provisions raise
$8.3 billion in corporate taxes in 1990. While the revenue estimate
overstates the significance of these provisions, since it includes a kind
of recapture of past expensing benefits for inventories, an analysis of
the impact of the Treasury proposals should not ignore this or similar
provisions. (Other omitted provisions that are fairly asset-specific in-
clude oil tax changes, mining tax changes, changes for pollution control
assets, etc.)
The second category of tax changes deals with financial intermedia-
tion. Most of these increase taxes currently paid by banks and insurance
companies. Some, including the non-bank bad debt proposal, however,
affect other firms in their capacity as lenders that hold accounts re-
ceivable. The changes in this area do not fit easily into a Jorgenson
cost-of-capital framework. Incorporating them requires modeling the
tax treatment of financial intermediaries and its effect on the cost of
capital. This is a rather forbidding task and it is unfair to expect Ful-
lerton and Henderson to provide such a new model in an otherwise
substantial project. Since, however, virtually all of the financial inter-
mediary changes raise corporate revenues, it is almost certain that they
raise the cost of capital. (These financial intermediary changes raise
more than $8.8 billion in 1990 under Treasury II.) Thus, due to this
omission alone, the Fullerton/Henderson results should be identified
as a clear understatement of the increase in the cost of capital caused
by the reform proposals.
The last general category of omitted corporate tax increases includes
the international tax changes. These involve requiring a per-country
foreign tax credit limit instead of a worldwide limit, changing the rules
determining whether income is foreign source or U.S. source, and other
changes. (In Treasury II the foreign provisions raise corporate taxes
by $5.1 billion in 1990.) Incorporating these changes is, presumably,
quite difficult since it requires including foreign investment in the model
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financial intermediary changes, all that can be expected of the Fuller-
ton/Henderson analysis is an acknowledgement of the omission and a
discussion of the likely bias caused by that omission.
Overall, the omissions make the results of the Fullerton/Henderson
study very unreliable. Essentially, Fullerton and Henderson examine
two hypothetical tax proposals that appear to involve a net reduction
in corporation income taxes. They do not really examine Treasury I
and Treasury II; those proposals, particularly Treasury I, involve a
significant increase in corporate taxes. Of course, simply looking at
the projected revenue changes is not an adequate alternative. None-
theless, it is disconcerting to have results presented purportedly de-
scribing the economic effects of tax reform bills that involve large
corporate tax increases balanced by personal tax reductions, whereas,
in fact, the results are based on an analysis of corporate tax reductions.
It should be recognized that this problem is not limited to the Ful-
lerton/Henderson analysis. There have been numerous economic stud-
ies of the effect of tax reform on the cost of capital, effective tax rates,
and the allocation of capital. The Treasury, for example, has confidently
asserted that Treasury II lowers the cost of capital. Economists have
testified before Congress presenting estimates of the effect various
reform proposals have on the cost of capital. Yet all of these studies
have the same or more omissions as Fullerton/Henderson. It is unfor-
tunate that economists have spoken with such confidence on the effect
of reform proposals that raise corporate taxes 25% to 40% based on
conclusions derived from modeling the effects of a corporate tax
reduction.
Tax Parameters
The effective tax rates used in the Fullerton/Henderson analysis are
the excess of the pre-tax return over the after-tax return divided by
the pre-tax return. Using their notation, the rates are given by:
p-5
With some manipulation, and ignoring property taxes and new share
finance, the effective tax rate for the corporate sector is:
p - S p - (r - IT)
P




The first term is the effective tax rate at the company level; it depends
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deductions), and u the corporate tax rate. The second term captures
the effects of financial policy and the difference between the corporate
tax rate and the tax rate on debt and retained earnings. For many cases,
the second term is as important, or more important, than the first in
determining the overall tax rate.
An accurate calculation of present law effective tax rates requires
accurate values for u, td (the tax rate on debt) and tre (the personal tax
rate on retained earnings). Comparable tax rates for noncorporate in-
vestments require an accurate value for tnc, the personal tax rate on
noncorporate investors.
The corporate tax rate, u, is taken to be .46. This would be accurate
if, at the margin, all corporations were taxable. However, the com-
putations in the paper indicate large negative effective corporate tax
rates. This lends to an apparent contradiction; if corporate rates are
generally negative and fairly large in absolute value, then u should be
less than .46. If, however, u is less than .46, the effective tax rates are
not so negative. The authors should conduct some experiments on
hypothetical firms whose growth tracks the overall growth of the mod-
eled economy to see if those firms have a positive tax base, so that u
is .46. If they do not have a positive tax base, either u should be lowered
or the model should be adjusted to reflect higher taxes.
The issues surrounding the values of td and tnc are different. Con-
ceptually, td reflects the tax rate on the marginal investors in taxable
bonds. It is those marginal investors who determine the taxable interest
rate. Similarly, tnc is the tax rate on the marginal investor in noncor-
porate equity. Calculation of td and tnc requires modeling individual
portfolio choice assuming progressive tax rates. The Fullerton/Hen-
derson paper does not do this. Instead, in it td and tnc are computed
as the weighted average tax rate of all those who earn interest or
noncorporate profits. This may be consistent with a model of portfolio
choice, but no such model is presented or referenced. Instead, the
paper asserts that the "marginal investment under consideration is an
equiproportionate increase in all capital stocks" (sec. 13.1.2) and from
this concludes that additional "debt and interest income, for example,
would be distributed among debt holders in proportion to their current
debt and interest income" and that the "appropriate marginal tax rate
is thus the average of all debt holders' marginal rates, weighted by
their interest income."
This reasoning is incorrect. The margin in question does not depend
upon some hypothetical proportionate expansion of the capital stock.
The margin exists even in a static setting and involves marginal portfolio
allocations by individuals. It may be that the computed tax rates are
correct, if it is assumed that each individual's portfolio distribution is
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tax rates. This, however, is not so much a model of marginal portfolio
choice as it is an ad hoc assumption.
To investigate the sensitivity of results to other values of td and tnc,
Fullerton and Henderson should consider alternatives. For example,
they might follow Hendershott's approach in a paper in this volume
and infer td from the implicit tax on tax exempt bonds. This gives a
value of td of about .3, higher than that used by Fullerton and Henderson.
The Corporate/Noncorporate Distortion
The authors model most industries as including both corporate and
noncorporate firms. The authors do not, however, provide any detailed
analysis of the determination of the distribution of corporate and non-
corporate firms within any industry. In effect they assume that, absent
differences in tax rates on the two business forms, the distribution
would be optimal. Tax rate differences cause the distribution to shift,
leading to efficiency losses. (They term these losses intersectoral ef-
ficiency losses.) The extent of the shift is measured by assuming an
elasticity of substitution between the different business forms.
As a conceptual matter, this model of the choice of business form is
quite rudimentary. As an empirical tool for estimating the efficiency
effect of a realistic tax reform proposal, it is without any grounds.
Fullerton and Henderson cannot be criticized for not providing a more
substantial empirical basis for their intersectoral efficiency estimates;
to do so is a separate and very ambitious research project. The criticism
is based on their portrayal of their empirical results as something more
than an illustration of their modeling techniques.
In recognition of the lack of empirical evidence on the determinants
of business form, Fullerton and Henderson use a range of values for
their elasticity from -.5 to 3. When there are different empirical es-
timates of an elasticity, but the values cover some reasonable range,
such sensitivity analysis is often an effective way of dealing with the
absence of a fairly precise, agreed upon estimate. In this case, however,
there is no real basis for the range used in the sensitivity analysis, nor
is there evidence suggesting that any constant elasticity form is appro-
priate. The sensitivity analysis, if pursued more than is reported in the
paper, might show how important changes in business form can be,
but unless they are shown to be unimportant over a very wide range
of possibilities, the specific results presented by Fullerton and Hen-
derson should not be relied upon in judging realistic tax proposals.
Summary
Overall the Fullerton/Henderson analysis is a significant improve-
ment in the modeling of tax changes. The specific results, however,
should not be relied upon for evaluating current reform proposals. They443 The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on the Allocation of Resources
are based on a caricature of the reform proposals. That caricature may
be useful, but that is quite unclear and should be investigated, not
assumed to be true. Further, crucial tax parameters need to be based
on models of portfolio behavior and made consistent with loss limita-
tions under our tax laws. Finally, the distortion in the choice of business
form is an interesting issue to include in large scale general equilibrium
models, but there is no empirical basis for evaluating its importance.